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COMMENT
MODIFYING THE RELIGIOUS LAND
USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED
PERSONS ACT TO CREATE A
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY
PROTECTION FOR RELIGIOUS
LANDOWNERS
Your home sits in a residential zone where a special-use permit is
required for certain activities. A neighbor seeks to lease his home to a
residential drug and alcohol rehabilitation center of which he is the
president. The center would house more than ten residents, most of
whom are recovering drug addicts or alcoholics with criminal records;
in order to house this number of unrelated persons, a special-use
permit is required. Your neighbors have voiced concerns about the
compatibility of the center with the residential character of the area
and the perceived threat to neighborhood safety. When your local
planning commission ultimately denies the permit based on
compatibility concerns, you are relieved.
However, soon the commission is taken to court under a federal
statute that gives religious organizations special rights in land-use
disputes-yes, the president of the center refers to it as a "Christian
discipleship program"-so you may soon have new neighbors.'
Now consider the purchase of a building near your home by an
Orthodox Jewish congregation consisting of less than forty members
who propose to meet there for Saturday services. They too need a
IThis hypothetical is based on Men of Destiny Ministries. Inc. v. Osceola County, No.
6:06-cv-624-Orl-3 IDAB, 2006 WL 321932 1, at *1, *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2006) (holding, after
a bench trial, that since other locations or methods-i.e., housing less residents-are reasonably
available there is no "substantial burden" and therefore no cause of action under RLUIPA).
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special-use permit from the local board, because all religious
organizations seeking to locate in the town must receive such a
permit; they too are denied. The board's reason for the initial denial is
insufficient parking and its reason for the second denial, after the
congregation modifies the plan to include more parking spaces, is
traffic congestion. The board stands by this reasoning even though it
is repeatedly reminded that Orthodox Jews do not drive on Saturday,
the day they will be gathering in the building to worship. The
congregation, too, may be eligible for relief under the federal statute
protecting religious landowners. 2
These two scenarios illustrate why the passage of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA',) 3 particularly the provisions pertaining to land-use-has generated so
much controversy.4 While some scholars argue that it gives religious
organizations an unconstitutional legal weapon in land-use disputes,5
others promote it as a long-overdue mechanism to place religious
organizations on a level playing field with other landowners.6 This
Comment assesses these arguments and ultimately concludes that, in
enacting RLUIPA, Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power. However, unlike some commentaries on the
subject, this Comment will not suggest that RLUIPA is fatally
flawed-rather, this Comment will propose modifications that would
render RLUIPA constitutional under Congress's enforcement power.
2 This hypothetical is based on Orthodox Minyan of Elkins Park v. Cheltenham Twp.
Zoning Hearing Bd, 552 A.2d 772, 774 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (holding, prior to the
enactment of the federal statute, that zoning board did not have a sufficient basis for denying the
permit).
3Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U. S.C. §§ 2000cc2000cc-S (2006).
4Many commentators have argued that the Act is constitutional. See, e.g., Roman P.
Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and InstitutionalizedPersons Act
of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 929 (2001); Michael Paisner, Note, Boerne Supremacy: CongressionalResponses to City
of Boeme v. Flores and the Scope of Congress's Article I Powers, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 537
(2005). Other commentators, however, have condemned the Act as unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 345-46 (2003); Daniel P.
Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Overbroad Applications and Troubling Implications of
RLUIPA 's Land Use Provisions, 29 Seattle U. L. REv. 805, 834 (2006) (arguing that RLUIPA
virtually exempts religious organizations from zoning laws).
5See, e.g., James L. Noles, Jr., Can Historic PreservationCoexist with Protectionsfor
Religious Land Uses?, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 89, 89 (2002) (noting that RLUIPA was
"1enacted with the putative purpose of defending religious freedom [but] is increasingly being
used as an offensive weapon for churches and religious organizations in battles against land use
regulation").
6 See. e.g., Storzer & Picarello, supra note 4, at 977 (arguing that RLUIPA protections
"were sorely needed, because the very constitutional standards they restate have been violated
frequently and nationwide").
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This Comment will not consider the constitutionality of RLUIPA's
land-use provisions under the Spending and Commerce Clauses.7
Part I will provide background regarding Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence, RLUIPA's legislative history, and Congress's
enforcement power, one basis Congress claimed as giving it authority
to enact RLUIPA and its unconstitutional predecessor, 8 the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). 9 Part 11 will argue that
enactment of RLUIPA was outside Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power. Specifically, it will consider
whether RLUIPA codifies Supreme Court precedent and whether the
Act is "congruent and proportional" to the harm it seeks to remedy.
Part 11 will ultimately conclude that neither of these tests is met. Part
III will argue that some statutory protection is necessary for those
seeking to use land for religious purposes and will suggest how
RLUIPA may be modified so as to provide this protection while
remaining within the confines of the enforcement power.
I.BACKGROUND
A. Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence
"Congress shall make no law ...prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion] ."lo The Supreme Court first interpreted the clause in 1879.11
Until the 1960s, the Court generally did not require that the
government exempt persons engaging in religious conduct from
2
adhering to laws enacted to promote safety and welfare.'1
Furthermore, Free Exercise claims were often coupled with other
constitutional claims enabling the Court to decide cases on alternative
7Congress claimed authority to enact RLUIPA under its enforcement power as well as
the Commerce and Spending Clauses. See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of
RL UIPA and Federalism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and its Impact
on Local Government, 40 URn. LAW. 195, app. (2008); see also infra note 36 and
accompanying text (briefly discussing the clauses as they relate to RLUIPA).
8 See City of Boemne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding RFRA is
unconstitutional as enactment was not within Congress's enforcement power).
9Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of
Boerne v. Flares, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
II Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding the conviction of a Mormon
for practicing polygamy and rejecting defendant's argument that laws forbidding polygamy
violate the Free Exercise Clause).
12 See, e.g., Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (upholding state Sunday
closing law as applied to Orthodox Jews on the grounds that such laws are reasonably related to
"improving the health, safety, morals and general well-being of. .. citizens."); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding a state statute requiring license for
parade/procession as applied to a religious organization on the grounds that a municipality has
the authority to assure the safety and convenience of persons using public streets).
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grounds-for example, the Court overturned city ordinances requiring
permits to distribute literature on public streets on freedom of speech
and press grounds, rather than on Free Exercise grounds even though
those convicted of violating the ordinances had been distributing
religious literature 1 3 Thus, the extent of the clause's protections
remained unclear.
However, in 1963, the Court established the first major exception
for religious activity; the Court held that in certain circumstances,
those engaging in religious activity need not adhere to certain public
safety and welfare laws. In doing so, the Court clarified the scope of
protections provided by the Free Exercise Clause. In Sherbert v.
Verner,14 the Court held that a state unemployment compensation law
that substantially burdened religious practice violated the Free
Exercise Clause because the law did not meet strict scrutiny. 15 Thus,
the Court created the Sherbert exception, which exempted those
engaging in religious activity from adhering to the law in certain
circumstances; the exception provides that where a law substantially
burdens religious practice, the law must meet strict scrutiny in order
to not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. Until 1990, the Court
continued to apply the Sherbert exception. 16 Though arguably the
courts employing Sherbert did not apply strict scrutiny with the same
rigor as in other areas,' 7 they did, nonetheless, employ it.
In 1990, the Court imposed a substantial limitation on the Sherbert
exception. In Employment Division v. Smith, 18 the Court held that
13 Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); see also W. Va. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634-35 (1943) (holding, partially on free speech grounds, that
Jehovah's Witness students need not salute the flag or recite the pledge of allegiance).
14

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

15In this case, the state's Employment Security Commission denied unemployment
compensation to an applicant who refused to accept employment that required her to work on
Saturday, her day of worship, because the Commission did not consider this reason "good
cause" for rcfusing work. The applicant challenged the "good cause" requirement on Free
Exercise Clause grounds. Id. at 399-401.
16 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-21 (1972) (holding Amish residents
entitled to a Sherbert exception from a state requirement that all children attend school because
(1) the requirement was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest and (2)
requiring the Amish children to attend school would substantially burden their religious
practice).
17 See, e.g., Robert W. Tuttle, Regulating Sacred Space: Religious Institutions and Land
Use Controls: How Firn a Foundation?ProtectingReligious Land Use after Boeme, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 861, 919 (2000) ("[Fjree exercise cases before Smith accepted as compelling a
far wider range of governmental interests, including exceptionless participation in social
security.."
18494 U.S. 872 (1990). In the case, the state of Oregon denied applicants' request for
unemployment benefits on the grounds that the applicants had been fired for ingesting peyote,
which constituted disqualifying "misconduct" under the unemployment compensation statute.
The applicants challenged the denial on the grounds that ingesting peyote was part of their
religious practices, and therefore the state's denial of benefits violated their rights to free
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Sherbert does not provide an individual with an exemption from a
generally applicable criminal law, even if the law substantially
burdens the individual's religion. In other words, the Court limited
the Sherbert exception by providing that a "neutral and generally
applicable" law that substantially burdens religion need not meet
strict scrutiny in order to pass constitutional muster. Thus, after Smith,
the Sherbert exception applied to a much narrower class of laws. In
the context of the Free Exercise Clause, the strict scrutiny standard
only applied to laws that (1) impose a substantial burden on religion
and (2) are not "neutral and generally applicable." Some suggest that
the Sherbert exception is further limited to unemployment
compcnsation cases alone. 19 How-ever, circuit courts addressing the
20
issue have declined to so interpret the Smith limitation on Sherbert.
Though the Sherbert-Smith line of cases clarifies the scope of the
Free Exercise Clause, the cases prompt additional questions: What
constitutes a "neutral and generally applicable" law? ; 2 '1At what point
does a burden on religion become "substantial"? ; 22 And, finally, what
activities involve "religious practice",? 23 As the next section suggests,
RLUIPA and its predecessor represent Congress's attempt to answer
some of these questions.

exercise. Id. at 874.
19 See. e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 ("We [the Court] have never invalidated any
governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment
compensation.... In recent years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside
the unemployment compensation field) at all."); John P. Forren, Revisiting Four PopularMlyths
About the Peyote Case, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 209, 230 (2006) (stating courts have generally
held that Smith limited the Sherbert exception to unemployment compensation cases).
20 See. e.g., Mount Elliot Cemetery v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398 (6th. Cir. 1998)
(considering whether the challenged law was neutral and generally applicable in determining
whether Sherbert test applied in spite of the fact that the law did not relate to unemployment
compensation); accord Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 (8th
Cir. 1991).
21 For a discussion of the "neutral and generally applicable" standard, see infra Part IL.A
(considering whether land-use laws are inherently "neutral and generally applicable"); infra Part
lIl.B.2 (proposing a scheme by which to evaluate whether a land-use law is "neutral and
generally applicable").
22 For a discussion of what constitutes a substantial burden on religion, see infra Part ILA
(discussing different courts' interpretations of what constitutes a substantial burden on religion);
infra Part III.B.2 (proposing a definition for "substantial burden").
23 For a discussion of what activities involve "religious practice," see infra Part ILA
(suggesting that RLUIPA's protection of "religious exercise" rather than "religious practice"
may render it unconstitutional); infra Part III.B.2 (proposing a definition of "religious
practice").
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B. RLUIPA 's Legislative History
Congress was displeased with the limitations the Smith Court
placed on the Sherbert exception. In response, it passed Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") 2 4 in 1993. RFRA' s explicitly
stated purpose was to "restore the compelling interest test as set forth
in Sherbert . .. and to guarantee its application in all cases where free
exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 25 Thus, RFRA was
Congress's attempt to overrule Smith. Under RFRA, the
characterization of a law as "neutral and generally applicable" was no
longer relevant. 26 Congress justified this position by a finding that, "in
... Smith the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that
the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
27
neutral toward religion."
Less than five years later, the Court declared RFRA
unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores. 28 The Court held that
Congress had exceeded its enforcement power in enacting RFRA .
The Court stated: "RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It
appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional
protections."3 0 Since Congress's enforcement power is limited to
remedial measures and Congress may not use the power to create a
substantive change in the law, the Court held RFRA
unconstitutional .
Congress's response to City of Boerne came in 200032 when it
passed RLUIPA. RLUIPA varied from RFRA in several significant
respects. Its scope was much narrower than its predecessor's-its
protections were limited to (1) land-use decisions affecting religion
and (2) policies of institutions affecting institutionalized persons'
24 Plub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of
Boerne v. Flares, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l) (2000), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
26 The Act also was not limited to unemployment compensation laws. See supra Part L.A
(noting that some argue the Smith decision limited the compelling interest test to unemployment
compensation laws).
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
28 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
29 For a discussion of the case in the context of an explanation of Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement powers, see infra Part I.C.
30 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
31 See infra Part ILC for a full discussion of the Boerne Court's reasoning.
32 RLUIPA's legislative predecessor, the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, was
introduced twice, H.R. Res. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. Res. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998), but
failed to move beyond the Senate Judiciary Committee.
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practices of religion. 33 Also, Congress claimed authority to enact
RLUIPA under not only its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
powers, but also under the Commerce and Spending Clauses. As this
Comment focuses on the validity of the land-use provisions of
RLUIPA under the enforcement power, the provisions relating to
institutionalized persons and Congress's authority to enact RLUIPA
pursuant to the Commerce and Spending Clauses is outside the
Comment's scope. Note, however, that the Court has upheld the
provisions relating to institutionalized persons; 34 also commentators
have argued, and lower courts have held, that the Commerce
and Spending Clauses do not justify RLULPA. This leaves the
enforcement power as the only grounds upon -whichRLUIPA may be
constitutionally valid.3
The relevant part of RLUIPA, Section Two' 36 deals with land-use
decisions affecting religion. It provides:
No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on
the religious exercise of a person including a religious
assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates
that imposition of the burden ...
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(B3) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.

33
34

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-I (2006).
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (holding that Section 3 of RLUIPA is

constitutional).
35 See, e.g., Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1102
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding RLUIPA unconstitutional on the grounds that it exceeds Congress's
powers under the Commerce Clause); Hamilton, supra note 4, 352, n.170 (2003) (citing In re
Rowland, no. HC 4172 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 31, 2002) (holding RLUIPA unconstitutional under

the Spending and Establishment Clauses)); Lam A. Berwanger, Note,

White Knight? Can the

Commerce Clause Save the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act?, 72
FoRDHA~m L. REv. 2355, 2389-401 (2004) (arguing that RLUIPA is unconstitutional because it
exceeds the Commerce Clause); Diane K. Hook, Comment, The Religious Land Use and
InstitutionalizedPersons Act of 2000: Congress' New Twist on "Speak Softly and Carry a Big
Stick", 34 URB. LAW. 829, 850 (2002) (arguing that RLUIPA is unconstitutional under the
Spending Clause); Evan M. Shapiro, Notes & Comments, The Religious Land Use and
InstitutionalizedPersons Act: An Analysis Under the Commerce Clause, 76 WASH. L. REV.
1255 (2001) (arguing that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in enacting
RLUIPA).
36 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(a)(1) (2006).
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In addition, RLUIPA supplies a definition for "religious
exercise.",37 It also provides that where the challenged decision or law
does not meet the requirements of the Spending or Commerce
Clauses,3 the action must involve an "individualized assessment."3
Thus, though RLUIPA is narrower than RFRA, it has a similar
effect in that it seeks to answer some of the questions left open by the
Smith Court. More specifically, RLUIPA's application of the
compelling interest test to land-use decisions demonstrates
Congress's understanding that the Sherbert exception applies beyond
the unemployment compensation field. Its definition of "religious
exercise" guides courts in determining what activities are protected by
RLUIPA, while its failure to explicitly define substantial burden has
created uncertainty. 40 Finally, by requiring an "individualized
assessment," Congress has arguably accepted the Smith Court's
decision to limit application of the Sherbert exception to situations
involving laws that are not "neutral and generally applicable."'
Whether the answers RLUIPA provides are consistent with the
Court's precedent is fundamental to determining whether the Act is
constitutional under the enforcement power.
C. Congress 's Section Five Enforcement Power in the Context Of
RFRA4
The Court has described the enforcement power as encompassing:

37 Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (defining religious exercise as "any exercise of religion, whether
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief'); see also id. § 2000cc-5(7)(B)
(explicitly including the "use, building, or conversion" of realty in the definition of religious
exercise).
38 Essentially, RLUIPA's protections only apply when one of the Act's jurisdictional
hooks is satisfied. Two of the Act's jurisdictional hooks are the Commerce and Spending
Clauses; thus, where a burden would affect interstate comnmerce the Commerce Clause hook is
satisfied and where a burden is imposed on a program receiving federal flmding, the Spending
Clause hook is satisfied. The final basis for the Act is the enforcement power-as discussed at
length in this Comment, only burdens resulting from individualized assessments satisfy the
enforcement power hook. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 7, at 2 10-11 for fuirther discussion of
RLUIPA's jurisdictional hooks.
39 Id § 2000cc(2)(c); see also id § 2000cc2(a)-(b) (stating that RLUIPA will govern a
challenge to a neutral and generally applicable law where the law imposes a substantial burden
on religion and the law "is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial
assistance" or "affects ... commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with
Indian tribes").
40 For a discussion of the varying definitions courts have assigned to "substantial burden"
and a proposal for a more uniform definition, see infra Part III.B.2.
41 Without a definition of "individualized assessment," the Act likely would not be
appropriately limited so as to ensure it does not invalidate laws that would be valid under Smith.
For an argument that RLUIPA expands the scope of the Sherbert test even with the
"individualized assessment" language, see infra Part II.A. 1.
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Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry
out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends
to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to
secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial
or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power. 42
Given this broad description of Congress's enforcement power
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 it would seem
that Congress's power to pass legislation enforcing the Constitution is
virtually limitless. However, the Court has distinguished remedial
legislation from legislation creating a substantive change in the law,
instructing that Congress may only enact remedial legislation under
the enforcement power."4 The Court has further stated that it will
defer to Congress's determination that it is acting within its
enforcement power. But, where it is unclear whether Congress is
creating new law, rather than enacting remedial legislation as
permitted by the enforcement power, the law's constitutionality will
rest on whether the Court finds that the law is "congruent and
proportional" to the harm Congress purports to remedy.4
These two guideposts for determining when legislation is
substantive-whether the law codifies the Court's precedent and
whether the law meets the "congruence and proportionality" testwere crucial to the Boerne Court's holding that Congress exceeded its
enforcement power by enacting RFRA. That is, the Boerne Court
concluded that RFRA did not codify Court precedent, and,
furthermore, that it was not "congruent and proportional," because the
evidence did not establish that governments engage in a widespread
practice of using zoning laws to discriminate against religious groups.
The Court found support for its conclusion that RFRA exceeded
the protections of the Free Exercise Clause in the congressional
debates over RFRA, because members of Congress "criticized the
[Smith] Court's reasoning, and this disagreement resulted in the
42

Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article").
44 See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (stating the enforcement
power gives Congress "the power 'to enforce' [a constitutional right], not the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation").
45 See id at 520 (noting that while it is appropriate to give Congress "wide latitude" in
acting in accordance with its enforcement power "[tihere must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end ... [, without this], legislation may become substantive in operation and effect").
43
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passage of RFRA.,, 4 6 Looking to the rule of Smith'4 7 the Boerne Court
held that RFRA's requirement that all laws imposing substantial
burdens on religion meet strict scrutiny was an "attempt [at] a
substantive change in constitutional protections" 48 since "[laws valid
under Smith would fail under RFRA.",49 Essentially, the Court
recognized a fatal flaw in RFRA-it was inconsistent with the
Court's precedent.
The Court also determined that RFRA did not meet the
"congruence and proportionality" test because it "is so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot
be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior."5 0 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
relied on the deficient legislative record , the absence of limiting
mechanisms,5 2 and RFRA' s "sweeping coverage."5
11. CONGRESS EXCEEDED ITS ENFORCEMENT POWER By ENACTING
RLUIPA
The two guideposts for determining when a law is substantive and
hence inconsistent with the enforcement power-whether the law
codifies the Court's precedent and whether the law meets the
"congruence and proportionality" test-show that in enacting
RLUIPA, Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment power.
However, RLUIPA comes closer to meeting the two tests than RFRA
and, therefore, with some modifications, would be appropriate
remedial legislation that protects religious organizations while
avoiding broad infringement on the rights of local governments to
enact and enforce zoning laws.

46 See id

at 515.

held that neutral and generally applicable laws may substantially burden religious
practice even if the laws do not meet strict scrutiny. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
884, 885 (1990) ("To make an individual's obligation to obey such a [generally applicable] law
contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's
interest is 'compelling' . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.").
48 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
491dat 534.
501dat 532.
51Id. at 530-31 (comparing RERA's legislative record unfavorably to that of the Voting
Rights Act).
52 Id. at 532-33 (noting that RFRA has no termination date or mechanism, and is not
limited to geographic areas where evidence shows land-use laws are frequently used as a pretext
for discrimination against religious groups).
53Id. (noting that the Act "ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing
laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject
matter").
47 Smith
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A. RLUIPA Does Not Codify Supreme CourtPrecedent Because It
Expands the Scope of Laws that are Subject to Strict Scrutiny
RLUIPA's proponents claim that the Act merely codifies the
Smith-Sherbert line of cases 5. However, close analysis of the statute
and Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence demonstrates that RLUIPA
exceeds the Court's interpretation of the clause. Specifically,
RLUIPA does not limit strict scrutiny review to laws that (1) assess
an individual's motivation for his actions 55 and (2) substantially
burden his religious practice. Rather, RLUIPA expands strict scrutiny
review to include laws that (1) assess an individual's use of her
property and (2) substantially burden her religious exercise.
1. The Court Has Not Applied Strict Scrutiny to Laws Assessing
Propriety of Land Use
Some commentators argue that zoning laws are inherently "neutral
and generally applicable."5 According to this argument, RLUIPA
fails because applying strict scrutiny to such laws directly contravenes
the rule the Court announced in Smith, that laws substantially
burdening religion need not meet strict scrutiny if they are "neutral
and generally applicable."5
However, such an extreme view of zoning laws is not necessary to
conclude that RLUIPA is not a mere codification of the Court's
precedent. Though the Court has never precisely defined what
constitutes a "neutral and generally applicable law,, 58 a review of
Sherbert makes it clear that limiting RLUIPA to zoning laws
involving "individualized assessments" is not sufficient to ensure the
scope of the Act does not expand the scope of the Sherbert decision.
54 See, e.g., Storzer & Picarello, supra note 4, at 979 (arguing that RLUIPA "do[es] little,
if anything more, than codify existing First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence").
55 For instance, in

Sherbert, the individual's motivation for her action, refusing work, was

her religious belief that working on the Sabbath was not appropriate.
56 Caroline R. Adams, Note, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Will RLUIPA 's Strict Scrutiny Survive the Supreme
Court's Strict Scrutiny?, 70 FORDHAm L. REv. 2361, 2406-07 (May 2002) (noting that the
Smith Court cited a traffic law as an example of a "neutral and generally appiicable" law and
arguing "[tihe similarity in procedure between land-use regulations and the traffic law in Cox
[the case Smith Court cited] strongly suggests that the former are also generally applicable
despite their system of individualized assessments and thus that they [land-use regulations] do
not fit within the Sherbert exception").
57 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 884, 884-85 (1990).
58 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543
(1993) ("In this case we need not define with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a
prohibition is of general application, for these ordinances fall well below the minimum standard
necessary to protect First Amendment rights."),

778

778

WESTERN
~CASE RESERVE LA W RE VIEW

[Vol.
[o.5: 59:3

Sherbert and its progeny applied to situations where a law called
for an assessment of an individual's motivation for acting. For
instance, in Sherbert the challenged law called for an assessment of
whether an applicant for unemployment compensation had "good
cause" for refusing available employment. Likewise, in Church of the
5 the Court applied strict
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
scrutiny to the challenged law because it required an assessment of
whether killing an animal for religious purposes was "unnecessary."6
In contrast, in Smith the Court held that the challenged law was not
subject to strict scrutiny review even if it substantially burdened
religion. That law provided that unemployment compensation was
unavailable to applicants who had engaged in work-related
misconduct, including drug use. As such, the law did not require an
assessment of the individual's motivation for acting-i.e., it did not
take into account whether applicants had "good cause" for their
"'misconduct." Instead, it was an across-the-board prohibition; a law
that the Court described as "neutral and generally applicable."
Unlike the laws challenged in Sherbert and Church of Lukumi,
zoning laws do not call for decisions based on landowners'
motivations for engaging in certain land use-rather, they require
decisions based on whether the land use itself is appropriate. Thus,
land-use laws are not covered by the Sherbert decision, which called
for application of strict scrutiny to only those laws that require
individualized determinations about a person's reasons for acting. As
such, RLUIPA's application of strict scrutiny to zoning laws does not
codify, but actually expands the Court's Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence.
Furthermore, if zoning laws involving "individualized
assessments" as defined by RLUIPA are eligible for strict scrutiny
protections, then any zoning decision that substantially burdens
religion could be eligible for strict scrutiny review. That is, a
landowner can easily convert even those laws that proponents of
RLUIPA would agree are "neutral and generally applicable" into
"individualized assessments." For instance, if an ordinance prohibits
buildings over a certain number of stories and a religious organization
wishes to build a higher structure, the organization merely needs to
59 508 U.S. 520.
60 Id. at 537 (reasoning that the challenged law is unconstitutional because "it requires an
evaluation of the particular justification for the kiling [of an animal] . . . [and therefore]
represents a system of 'individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant
conduct,.... [As the Smith Court held,] in circumstances in which individualized exemptions
from a general requirement are available," exemptions imposing a substantial burden must meet
strict scrutiny (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 884, 884 (1990))).
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apply for a zoning amendment, special exception, or a variance 61 to
convert the decision to an "individualized" one.6 This highlights that
the effect of RLUIPA is overly broad 63 and, therefore, RLUIPA is
4
not a mere codification of the Court's Free Exercise decisions.
2. The Court Has Not Applied Strict Scrutiny to Laws Substantially
Burdening Religious Exercise
The argument that RLUIPA codifies Court precedent suffers from
an additional flaw. Specifically, the Court has always defined the
Sherbert exception as applying where a law "forces [an individual] to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to [receive the benefits], on the other hand.",65 The
Court has come to refer to this as a substantial burden on "religions
practice."6
RLUIPA, on the other hand, provides protection against laws
substantially burdening "religious exercise." It gives "religious
exercise" a broad definition: "[tlhe term 'religious exercise' includes
any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to a
system of religious belief." The definition explicitly includes the "Use,
building, or conversion" of realty.6 A comparison of laws the Court
has held substantially burden religious practice and those laws courts
have held fall under RLUIPA (on the grounds that the laws burden
religious exercise) highlights the difference between religious practice
and exercise.

61 Frank T. Santoro, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Religious Land
Use and InstitutionalizedPersons Act, 24 WHITTIER L. REv. 493, 516-33 (2002) (explaining
the mechanics of zoning laws in the context of Free Exercise).
62 See Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the Fall: The Case for
Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 925, 937 (1998) ("[I]f the 'system of
exemptions' caveat to Smith is taken seriously, it cuts a potentially large loophole into the Smith
ruling. Most zoning regimes ...have a special use permit procedure that allows exemptions, on
a case-by-case and individualized basis ... )
63 For further discussion of the broad reach of the Act, see infra Part IB.
64See, e.g., Santoro, supra note 61, at 513 (noting that Smith narrowed the applicability of
the Sherbert exception); Aridl Graff, Calibrating the Balance of Free Exercise, Religious
Establishment, and Land Use Regulation: Is RLUIPA an Unconstitutional Response to an
OverstatedProblem?, 53 UCLA L. REv. 485, 492 (2005) ("[Tlhe [Smith] Court explained that
Sherbert stands for [a] limited principle. .. )
65 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
66 See, e.g., Church of the Lukums Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993) ("[A] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application
must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny."~ (emphasis added)).
67 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-5(7) (2006).
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For example, in Sherbert the Court concluded that attending
worship services on the Sabbath is religious practice. 68 Attending
worship services on a day of obligation is clearly distinguishable from
the construction courts have given "religious exercise" under
RLUIPA. For example, courts have consistently held that operating a
religious school is religious exercise . 69 Furthermore, in one case a
religious organization attempting to expand its facility to construct a
daycare used RLUIPA to successfully challenge a town's denial of
the required permit.7 More extreme cases have held that religious
retreats operated by secular organizations, 7 1 religious hospitals, 72 and
faith-based rehabilitation centers 7 3 involve religious exercise.
Operating a religious hospital, or even a school, is clearly very
different from attending services on the Sabbath-herein lies the
difference between religious exercise and religious practice. Since
RLUIPA protects religious exercise, instead of the narrower range of
activities encompassed by the term religious practice, RLUIPA is not
a mere codification of the Court's precedent. RLUIPA thus expands
Free Exercise protections beyond the Court's Sherbert exception
because (1) it covers laws that do not involve an assessment of an
individual's motivation for acting and (2) it extends protection
beyond religious practice to religious exercise.

68 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of
Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987) ("Here, as in Sherbert and Thomas, the State may not force an
employee 'to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits,....
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work."' (quoting Sherbert,
374 U.S. at 404)). The Court has also held certain other activities involve religious practice. See,
e.g., Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531 (accepting animal sacrifice as an "integral part" of
the Santeria religion, which involves such sacrifices as a principle form of devotion to God);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (198 1) (reasoning
that if a Jehovah's Witness has a good-faith belief that his religion forbids participation in the
production of armaments, a law requiring that he choose between following that belief or
sacrificing a benefit imposes a substantial burden on religious practice).
69 See, e.g., Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 25 8 Fed.Appx. 729
(6th. Cir. 2007); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d. Cir.
2007); Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, SA-0lI-CA-lI 149-RE, 2004 WL
54792 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004).
70 Living Water Church of God, 258 Fed.Appx. 729.
71 DiLaura v. Twp. of Ann Arbor, 112 Fed. App'x 445 (6th Cit. 2004).
72 Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc. v. Morgan County, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1050
(S.D. Ind. 2005) (suggesting, but not conclusively stating, that a religious hospital involves
religious exercise).
73 Men of Destiny Ministries. Inc. v. Osceola County, No. 6:06-cv-624-Orl-3lDA-B, 2006
WL 3219321, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2006) (reasoning that though a rehabilitation center
involved religious exercise, the challenged ordinance did not place a substantial burden on such
exercise).
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B. RL UIPA Does Not Meet the "Congruence and Proportionality"
Test
Even though RLUIPA broadens the Sherbert exception, the Act
may still be constitutional if the remedy-applying strict scrutiny to
land-use regulations that impose a substantial burden on religious
exercise-is "congruent and proportional" to the harm the Act seeks
to cure.7 RLUIPA's legislative history indicates that it was intended
to prevent the use of zoning laws as a pretext to discriminate against
5
certain religious groups]7
To test for congruence and proportionality, 7 6 the Boerne Court
examined whether the legislative record established widespread
discriminatory practices 7, and whether the Act was limited to address
only demonstrated discrimination . 78 Analyzing these two factors in
the context of RLUIPA leads to a conclusion that the Act does not
meet the "congruence and proportionality" test. That is, applying
strict scrutiny to all land-use decisions and laws that impose a
substantial burden on religious exercise is not "congruent and
proportional" to the moderate evidence that governments use zoning
as a tool to discriminate against religious groups.
RLUIPA's legislative record consists largely of anecdotal
evidence 79 that the Court has generally held is insufficient to show the
widespread pattern of discrimination required for Congress to invoke
its enforcement power .80 Furthermore, what is absent from the
legislative record may be as significant as its contents. Specifically,
the record does not contain the testimony of a single land use expert .'
Additionally, Congress excluded from the record the most scientific
study 82 conducted by a neutral party regarding land use data and
74 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) ("Legislation which deters or
remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power
even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional .. 1)
75 See 146 Cong. Rec. S 7774-01 (2001) (Joint Statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy on
RLUIPA) (noting that discriminatory enforcement of zoning laws is widespread and RLUIPA is
needed to address this problem).
76 See supra Part L.C for complete discussion of the Court's application of the congruence
and proportionality test to RFRA.
77 See City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 530-3 1.
78 Id at 532-33 (noting that RFRA has no limiting mechanisms and will affect
government at every level).
79 See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 345-46.
80 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-32 ("Much of the [legislative record] discussion
centered upon anecdotal evidence of autopsies performed on . .. [persons] in violation of their
religious beliefs," and, therefore, the record was insufficient.).
81 See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 4, at 345-46 (noting that such testimony would be
highly useful to aid understanding of the legal principles in the field and to analyze the Act's
potential impact).
12 Hamilton, supra note 4, at 351 ("By the time RLUIPA was introduced, the most
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religious organizations; this study indicated that the use of zoning to
discriminate against religious groups was not widespread.8
Furthermore, even if the legislative record was sufficient to show
the necessary widespread discrimination, RLUIPA, like RFRA' 84 is
far too sweeping to be "congruent and proportional." First, by its
terms it is overly broad. Specifically, the Act's expansive definition
of "religious exercise" 8 5 encompasses many activities and, as the
Boerne Court noted, claims that a law substantially burdens an
individual's religion are generally difficult to contest. 86Moreover, the
very terms of the Act state it "shall be construed in favor of broad
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by
87
[the law]."
In addition to its terms, the lack of any limiting mechanism
enhances RLUIPA's sweeping effect. For instance, statutes passed
under the enforcement power may be limited (so as to be "congruent
and proportional") by geographic constraints 8 8 or by termination
provisions .8 RLUIPA is not so limited. Finally, the "individualized

scientific study of land use data and churches to date was published in the Journal of Church
and State.").
83 Mark Chaves & William Tsitsos, Are Congregations Constrained by Government?
Empirical Results from the National Congregations Study, 42 J. CHURCH AND STATE 335, 34142 (2000) (stating that only I percent of religious organizations seeking a zoning permit were
denied and, of this I percent, over 83 percent of the organizations were mainstream). These
conclusions undermine the congressional record in that Congress suggested that there is
widespread use of zoning laws to discriminate against non-mainstream religions. Furthermore,
evidence suggesting RLUIPA is disproportionate to the problem of discriminatory zoning laws
is conspicuously absent. For example, Congress neglected to include a letter from Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani to Congress, which asked that Congress delay the enactment of RLUIPA until
cities could assess the impact of the Act. Hamilton, supra note 4, at 3 52.
84 See supra Part L.C for complete discussion of the Boerne Court's conclusion that RFRA
is not congruent and proportional regardless of the legislative record.
85 See Lennington, supra note 4, at 834-35 ("[T]he definition of 'religious exercise' is so
broad ... [that] under RLUIPA, it is unlawful for the government to place a substantial burden
on the use of a building ... [thus] the government cannot prohibit a church from building in a
certain location.").
86 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) ("'..What principle of law or
logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is "central"
to his personal faith?"'. (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990)));
Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 755, 766
(1999) (noting that it is difficult for governments to argue that they have a "compelling" interest
in enforcing local zoning codes); Lennington, supra note 4, at 834 ("The plain language of the
statute [RLUIPA] seems to dictate a result that, if carried to its logical extreme, would give
religious institutions a free pass when confronted with local zoning issues.").
87 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006).
88 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966) (reasoning, in
part, that the challenged provisions of the Voting Rights Act were permissible because they
were limited to geographic regions where evidence demonstrated voting discrimination was
most egregious).
89 See, e.g., id. at 331 (reasoning, in part, that the Voting Rights Act provisions were
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assessment" limitation does little, if anything, to narrow the scope of
the Act. As discussed, 90 a landowner can easily convert the
application of any land-use ordinance into an "individualized
assessment" by merely applying for a zoning amendment, special
exception, or variance. Thus, the "individualized assessment"
requirement does not significantly limit the scope of the Act.
Given the limited evidence of widespread use of zoning laws to
discriminate against religious organizations, evidence that such laws
are not widely used as tools of discrimination, the broad terms of the
Act, and the lack of any significant limiting mechanisms within the
Act, RLUIPA does not satisfyr the "congruence and proportionality"
requirement. This failure is fuirther evidence that the Act represents a
substantive change in the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore is
outside Congress's enforcement power.
III. MODIFYING RLIJIPA To PROVIDE RELIGIOUS GROUPS WITH
NECESSARY PROTECTION FROM DISCRIMINATORY ENACTMENT AND
ENFORCEMENT OF LAND-USE LAWS

Though the deficient evidence of discriminatory use of zoning
laws is inadequate support for the broad reach of RLUIPA, the
evidence likely is sufficient to support narrower legislation protecting
religious landowners. 9 '
A. The Evidence
Part 11 focused on shortcomings in the legislative record. However,
these shortcomings do not necessarily indicate that there are not a
significant number of circumstances where governments have
unconstitutionally denied religious organizations' land-use proposals.
RLUIPA's congressional record contained statistical and anecdotal
evidence 92 indicating that there are instances where zoning decisions

permissible because they had a termination mechanism).
90 Supra Part Il.A.lI.
9' See, e.g., J. Jeffery Patterson, The Long Road Towards Restoration of Religious
Freedom: Congressional Options in Light of City of Boerne v. Flores, 87 KY. L.J. 253, 268
(1999) (noting that Douglas Laycock "supports the concept of another RFRA-like bill based on
the enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment" and emphasizes that Boerne "'does not
deprive Congress of all power to protect religious exercise under its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment"' (quoting Congress' Constitutional Role in Protecting Religious
Liberty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary. 105th Cong. 9 (1997) (prepared
statement of Douglas Laycock))).
92 Adams, supra note 56, at 2375-80 (detailing the anecdotal evidence contained in
RLUIPA's record).
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are a pretext for discrimination. 93 While this record is not sufficient to
support RLUIPA-because RLUIPA requires strict scrutiny review of
almost all zoning decisions imposing a substantial burden-the record
is likely sufficient support for more moderate legislation.9
B. PotentialSolutions
Several commentators advocating a view that RLUIPA is
unconstitutional have nevertheless recognized the need for statutory
protection of religious organizations in the context of zoning
decisions. For instance, commentators have proposed applying
intermediate scrutiny to zoning laws.9 Others have proposed
constitutional amendments to the effect that no law may substantially
burden religion unless the law meets strict scrutiny.9 While these
proposals have their merits, they are overly complex,9 7 and therefore a
better approach is to modify RLUIPA in a manner such that it would
survive a constitutional challenge.
C The ProposedSolution: Modifying RL UIPA
The fundamental problem with the current language of RLUIPA is
that it is overly broad-it prohibits actions that are not barred by the
Court's Free Exercise Clause cases and its prohibitions are not
"congruent and proportional" to the evidence of discriminatory use of
zoning laws. Thus, in order to remedy the statute, its effect must be
tempered to prohibit only (1) those actions that the Court has held are
93 See id. at 2380-82 n.145 (noting that many of the witnesses who testified before
Congress cited a Brigham Young University study that stood for the proposition that minority
religions are frequently discriminated against in zoning decisions).
94 This is particularly likely to be true if some of the shortcomings in the record are
addressed-i.e., include testimony from land-use experts and address evidence suggesting that
there is no need for statutory protection of religious landowners.
95 See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 62, at 937 (proposing application of intermediate scrutiny
to "neutral and generally applicable" laws substantially burdening religion after concluding that
zoning involves such laws).
96 See, e.g., Patterson,supra note 91, at 271-72.
97 For instance, the Boerne Court implicitly suggested that the RFRA would not be
constitutional even if it used intermediate scrutiny. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534
(1997) ("Even assuming RERA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, say,
one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would requre... . considerable
congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives. .. ). Likewise, a constitutional
amendment is very difficult to achieve, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, PracticalPositivism Versus
PracticalPerfectionism: The Hart-FullerDebate at Fifty, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1170, 1210 (2008)
("Our Constitution is overwhelmingly difficult to amend."), and such a broad expansion of the
Free Exercise Clause is likely to be problematic as a practical matter, see, e.g., City of Boerne,
521 U.S. at 534 ("The substantial costs RERA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a
heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional general
regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free
Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith.").
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violations of the Free Exercise Clause and (2) those actions, not yet
held to be violations of the Clause, whose prohibition is "congruent
and proportional" to the legislative record regarding discriminatory
use of zoning laws.
1. The ProposedLanguage
The proposed statute ("modified RLUIPA") incorporates some of
the language currently in the Act as well as some new language; it
would read as follows, with defined terms in quotations:
No government shall impose or implement a land-use
regulation in a manner that imposes a "substantial burden" on
the "religious practice" of an individual or an organization if
''evidence reasonably suggests'' that the burden is a result of
discrimination against the religion of the individual or the
organization unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden:
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of fuirthering that
compelling governmental interest.
The statute's scope provision would include a definition of
"individualized assessment." Modified RLUIPA would also contain a
termination provision to ensure it is limited to situations where Free
Exercise Clause violations are most likely.9
2. The Definitions
a. SubstantialBurden
RLUIPA does not provide a definition of "substantial burden." As
such, courts have defined the term differently hence creating
divergent results. 99 To avoid this problem and to ensure that the
modified statute only applies to a limited range of situations (as

98 A termination provision goes a long way toward ensuring congruence and
proportionality. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33 (noting that the termination provision
contained in the Voting Rights Act reduced the possibility of overbreadth). Such a provision for
RLUIPA would need to be drafted based on the most recent evidence regarding the prevalence
of Free Exercise violations, and therefore will not be proposed here.
99 See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 7, at app. (summarizing the various formulations of
"substantial burden").
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required to meet the "congruence and proportionality" test), modified
RLUJPA would define "substantial burden" narrowly:
A "substantial burden" is a burden that either compels
conduct in contravention of "religious practice" or makes it
impracticable for an individual or organization to adhere to
conduct that is required by its "religious practice"; a
"substantial burden" must be the result of significant pressure
from the government and does not include a mere
00
inconvenience.1
With this narrow definition, modified RLUIPA would apply only
to circumstances where the religious institution could show it could
not operate elsewhere, and the adverse zoning decision was not based
on grounds generally attributed to zoning decisions-i.e., traffic and
environmental concerns.1 0 ' Thus, the modified statute would apply if
a religious institution's request is denied on grounds that are
seemingly unrelated to public health or welfare, and the zoning board
does not give the organization an opportunity to modifyr its request to
02
meet the identified shortcomings.1
Such a definition of "substantial burden" would ensure that only
the narrow class of cases most likely to involve discriminatory use of
zoning laws fall under the modified statute. This, in turn, ensures a
"congruence and proportionality" between the statute and the
legislative record.
b. Religious Practice
"Religious practice" would be defined in a manner consistent with
the Court's precedent; the result is a narrower definition than
RLUIPA's definition of "religious exercise." The most common
[i]t
is not within the judicial
10Ti definition takes into account the Court's dictate that ...
ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of
particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds."' Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 884,
887 (1990) (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)).
101This would achieve results similar to those reached in San Jose Christian College v.
City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying narrow definition of
"substantial burden" and reasoning that no such burden was imposed where a religious college
was denied a petition for rezoning because there was no evidence that the college could not
operate elsewhere, and there was no indication that the city was holding the college to a
different standard than it used for non-religious organizations).
102This result would be consistent with Westchester Day School v. Village of
Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d. Cir. 2007) (applying a relatively narrow definition of
"substantial burden" and reasoning that, under such a definition, whether a denial is absolute is
'important [as] if there is a reasonable opportunity for the institution to submit a modified
application, the denial does not place substantial pressure on it to change its behavior and thus
does not constitute a substantial burden").
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definition prescribed by the Court is that "religious practice" involves
"the observation of a central religious belief or practice." 03 However,
this definition may run afoul of the Court's mandate that courts
should not inquire into the centrality of certain conduct to any given
religion.104 Therefore, modified RLUIPA would use another test
announced by the Court in its Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence:
Religious practice is any conduct that an adherent believes is
05
mandated by or prohibited by his religion.1
Thus, animal sacrifice as part of the Santeria faith' 06 would be
protected as "religious practice," as would attending worship services.
Even using a house of worship to engage in the sacramental ingestion
of peyote would be religious practice if the persons so using the land
believed their religion mandated such conduct. However, this latter
practice, use of an illegal drug, may be limited by other provisions of
the proposed statute-specifically, the law against using peyote may
be deemed "neutral and generally applicable" and therefore no cause
of action under modified RLUIPA would exist because the
"individualized assessment" requirement would not be satisfied.
c. IndividualizedAssessment
107
RLUIPA does not explicitly define "individualized assessment."
Though courts have generally interpreted the "individualized
assessment" requirement to mean that RLUIPA does not apply to
"neutral and generally applicable" laws, the Smith Court failed to
explicitly define this limitation, 18and teCourt has done little to
clarify the term since.' 09 Given this uncertainty, courts have

103See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babaiu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 565
(1993) (quoting Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699).
104Sesupranote 100 and accompanying text.
105See, e.g., Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that where an
individual is forced to forego the precepts of her religion, the individual's religious practice is
implicated).
106As the Court discussed in Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520.
107Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C)
(2006) (stating RLUIPA will apply where "individualized assessments of the proposed uses for
the property involved [are at issue]" but not prescribing what constitutes an individualized
assessment).
10 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-90.
19
0 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543 ("In this case we need not define with
precision the standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application, for these
ordinances fail well below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amendment
rights.").
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developed divergent views regarding the types of zoning laws to
which RLUIPA applies 1 10
In order to clarify this uncertainty and to ensure the statute is
"congruent and proportional," modified RLUIPA would contain a
constricted definition of "individualized assessment":
An "individualized assessment" is one that involves a
detailed consideration of the specific land-use proposed by
the applicant.
This definition does not include "mechanical assessments,"~t
or situations where an applicant intervenes to convert a
"mechanical assessment" into an "individualized" one by
applying for a variance, zoning amendment, special
exception, or other similar exemption from a "mechanical
assessment" ordinance. The exclusion of "mechanical
assessments" is subject to two exceptions: (1) where the
"mechanical assessment" ordinance has been enacted within
the last six months; and (2) where the only means by which
the applicant can use any land in the jurisdiction is by seeking
an exemption from a "mechanical assessment" ordinance.1"'
Where either of these exceptions apply, the "individualized
assessment" requirement is satisfied for purposes of the Act.

110
Some courts have found that the variance process does not give rise to an individualized
assessment, and that zoning laws are neutral and generally applicable. See, e.g., Mount Elliot
Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding city's decision to
deny re-zoning request of operator of Catholic cemetery was neutral and generally applicable);
Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 (8th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that
the Sherbert exception does not apply to the challenged ordinance that excludes churches from
business zones because "[albsent evidence of the City's intent to regulate religious worship, the
ordinance is properly viewed as a neutral law of general applicability"); Saint Bartholomew's
Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d. Cir. 1990) (holding that Landmarks
Preservation Law from which church sought a variance was neutral and generally applicable
despite church's request for variance). However, other courts have found that the individualized
consideration inherent in the variance process does create an individualized assessment,
precluding a finding that zoning laws are neutral and generally applicable. See, e.g., Gunu Nanak
Sikh Soc'y of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that
since "RLUIPA applies when the government may take into account the particular details of an
applicant's proposed use of land," the county's denial of a conditional use permit involved an
individualized assessment); Freedom Baptist Church of Delaware County v. Twp. of
Middletown, 204 F.Supp.2d 857, 868 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (concluding that an application for a use
variance involved an "individualized assessment" because "[zoning laws are] of necessity
different from laws of general applicability which do not admit to exceptions on Free Exercise
grounds").
IIIExceptions for "mechanical rules" enacted within the last six months and those that
prohibit the sought land-use throughout the city are necessary to ensure that RLUIPA prohibits
discriminatory enactment of laws.

2009]

2009]
MODIFYING RL UIPA78

789

assessments" are those involving no
discretion-i.e., those based on the application of completely
objective criteria. For example, a "mechanical assessment"
occurs when a zoning ordinance prohibits buildings over a
certain height within a zone.
I"Mechanical

This definition is preferable to the state of "individualized
assessment" under the current case law, and, like the other proposed
definitions, ensures the requisite "congruence and proportionality."
It places limits on an applicant's ability to convert any land-use
decision into an "individualized" one and limits modified RLUIPA's
protections to certain types of zoning laws.' 12 As a result, it
guarantees strict scrutiny will apply to zoning laws in a manner
"congruent and proportional" to the somewhat limited evidence that
zoning laws are used as a pretext to engage in discrimination.
d. Evidence Reasonably Suggests
This is the only completely new language modified RLUIPA
contains. It is necessary because even the proposed, narrower version
3
of RLUIPA broadens the Court's Free Exercise Clause precedent."11
Without this additional provision, RLUIPA could overstep the
Court's Free Exercise doctrine by supporting a Free Exercise Clause
claim that does not include any showing of discrimination. The
"evidence reasonably suggests" standard tempers modified RLUIPA
and makes it more likely to survive constitutional review. The
standard imposes a low burden of proof, akin to probable cause, and
would be defined in the proposed statute as:
Evidence that would reasonably lead a person to conclude
that the decision was based on discrimination.
Requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate some minimal evidence of
discrimination balances two competing concerns. On one hand,
discrimination is often very difficult to show in the context of
discretionary decision-making (such as zoning boards' decisions); on
the other hand, the Court has never applied a presumption of
discrimination based merely on an adverse discretionary deiin'1
112Thus, the definition corrects courts that have held that land-use decisions and laws are
inherently "individualized" such as the court in Freedom Baptist Church, 204 F.Supp.2d at 868
("[Zoning laws are] of necessity different from laws of general applicability which do not admit
to exceptions on Free Exercise grounds.").
3
11
see Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (questioning whether the Sherbert test applies beyond the
unemployment compensation field).
4
11 See supra Part II.A. 1 (noting that zoning laws involve an assessment of the propriety of
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In essence, the standard is a compromise that furthers modified
RLUIPA's dual purpose: to protect religious landowners and to
preserve the abilities of local governments to enact and enforce
zoning laws.
3. Application-The PracticalEffect of Modified RL UIPA
Modified RLUIPA would lead to desirable results, as
demonstrated by returning to the hypothetical situations presented at
the beginning of this Comment." 5 In the first situation, a residential
drug and alcohol rehabilitation center seeks to locate in a residential
zone and seeks an exception to the limit on the number of unrelated
residents permitted in a single home. The zoning board explicitly
bases its denial on compatibility concerns and explicitly denies that
the decision was based on the residents' statuses as recovering addicts
or on the religious nature of the center." 6 The center likely would not
have a cause of action under modified RLUIPA. First, a limitation on
the number of residents a building in a certain zone may hold
involves a "mechanical assessment." Therefore, unless the challenged
ordinance qualified for one of the two exceptions" 7 to the general rule
that the statute does not cover "mechanical assessments," the center
would not be entitled to relief.
Even if the ordinance falls under one of the exceptions, the center
is still likely not eligible for protection under modified RLUIPA.
There is no indication that a certain number of residents is required to
engage in the "Christian discipleship program." In other words, the
ordinance does not require members of the center to engage in
activities contrary to or prohibit them from engaging in activities
required by their religion and therefore does not constitute a burden
on religious practice, much less a substantial one. Finally, these facts
likely do not "reasonably suggest" discrimination. Thus, the center
would have to state a constitutional claim directly. Such a claim
would require that the center prove actual discrimination thereby
perfecting a Free Exercise Clause claim, or that the center make an

a proposed land use while Sherbert and its progeny provide a religious exemption from laws
assessing an individual's motivation for his conduct).
5

11

Supra intro.

116
This hypothetical is based on Men of Destiny Ministries, Inc. v. Osceola County), No.

6:06-cv-624-OrI-31DAB, 2006 WL 3219321, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6,2006).
117That is, unless the ordinance limiting the number of residents was enacted within the
last six months or seeking an exemption from the ordinance is the only means by which the
center can use any land in the city.
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Equal Protection Clause claim by showing that there is no rational
basis for the board's decision.
In the second hypothetical discussed at the beginning of the
Comment, an Orthodox Jewish congregation sought a special permit
to use a building for Saturday services. The zoning board first denied
the permit on the grounds that there was a lack of parking spaces;
after the congregation modified the proposal to include additional
parking spaces and reminded the board that its members would not be
driving to Saturday services, the board cited traffic congestion as the
8
grounds for denying the permit.'"
The congregation would likely have a cause of action under
modified RLUIPA. Saturday worship involves religious practice for
an Orthodox Jew, because he believes his religion mandates such
conduct. Since the zoning board's decisions effect an absolute denial,
the decisions place a substantial burden on religious practice. In other
words, it is apparent that the congregation has no realistic opportunity
to modify the proposal to meet the city's concerns, lack of parking
and traffic congestion, because these concerns are mutually
19
exclusive.'
There is an "individualized assessment," even though the
congregation applied for a special permit, because the situation
qualifies for one of the exceptions to the general rule that the statute
does not cover "situations where an applicant intervenes to convert a
'mechanical assessment' into an 'individualized' one by applying for
20
a[n] . . . exemption from a 'mechanical assessment' ordinance."
Specifically, it qualifies as an "individualized assessment" because all
religious organizations seeking to locate in the town must receive a
special permit to operate-i.e., "the only means by which the
applicant [congregation] can use any land in the jurisdiction [town] is
by seeking an exemption from a 'mechanical assessment'
ordinance."'
Finally, given the probity of the facts already apparent, there is
likely "evidence reasonably suggesting" discrimination. Specifically,
1181This hypothetical is based on Orthodox Minyan of Elkins Park v. Cheltenham Twp.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 552 A.2d 772 (Pa. Commnw. Ct. 1989) (holding, prior to the enactment of
the federal statute, that zoning board did not have a sufficient basis for denying the permit).
H9 This would be consistent with the well-reasoned holding in Westchester Day School v.
Village of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d. Cir. 2007) (reasoning that in determining if a
substantial burden exists, whether a denial is absolute is "important [as] if there is a reasonable
opportunity for the institution to submit a modified application, the denial does not place
substantial pressure on it to change its behavior and thus does not constitute a substantial
burden").
2
1 0 Supra Part Ill.C.2 (defining "individualized assessment" for purposes of the proposed
statute).
21

1

Id.
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the zoning board's multiple denials made it effectively impossible for
the congregation to meet the city's requirements. Thus, the facts
likely would lead a person to reasonably believe that discrimination
has occurred.
CONCLUSION

Congress should not ignore the evidence that local governments
are using zoning ordinances to discriminate against religious groups;
however, it may not use this evidence as a basis for a far-reaching
statute that gives religious organizations a special legal weapon with
which to challenge any unfavorable zoning decision. Rather,
Congress should pass appropriate, remedial legislation that will
protect religious organizations while avoiding broad infringement on
the discretion of local governments to enact and enforce zoning laws.
This Comment's proposed modifications to RILUIPA do just that,
Modified RLUIPA, like RLUIPA, is an expansion of the Court's Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence, but, unlike RLUIPA, it is moderate
and therefore more likely to survive the Court's review under the
"congruence and proportionality" test.
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